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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM GARTH SEEGMILLER 
and MARJORIE SEEGMILLER, dba 
l\1.\DEMOISELLE BEAUTY SALON, 
or ~IADEMOISELLE SALON OF 
BEAUl~\~, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Case No. 9933 
vs. 
~\T., 1-IUNT, dba MADEMOISELLE 
COIFFURES, 
Defendant - Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a case involving both the Utah Statute ap-
plicable to tmdemarks (Title 70, Utah Code Annotated) 
and the common law of trademarks, tradenames, and un-
fair competition. 
Plaintiffs are the owners of a registration in the 
State of Utah of the trademark "MADEMOISELLE" 
issued to plaintiff June 2, 1961, for use in connection with 
"beauty salon and supplies." The registration is ·based 
on first use of the mark at least as early as May 1, 1959 
on beauty salon cosmetics'\ such as hair styling spray, and 
in connection with beauty culturre services such as are per-
formed in beauty salons. 
Plaintiffs' common law rights are based on first 
adoption and use in and throughout the State of Utah of 
the word "~1ADEMOISELLE" as a trademark and as a 
trade or business name. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the courrt, sitting without a 
jury. The court refused to grant the injunction as prayed 
for by plaintiffs and found the registration of the trade-
mark "MADEMOISELLE" by plaintiffs to be invalid. 
RELIEF SO:UGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of the lower 
court and judgment in th·eir favor declaring their registra-
ti:on with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah valid 
and enjoining and restraining the defendant from using 
the name "MADEMOISELLE" in th~e State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
WHliam Garth Seegmiller and Marjorie Seegmiller, 
his wife, began operation of the Mademoiselle Salon of 
Bea·uty in Provo, Utah, on or about May 1, 1959 (Tr. 6, 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A," 1-3-63) and at that time com-
menced the sale of hari·r styling spray in pressurized 
cans bearing labels imprinted with the trademark "MA-
DEMOISELLE" (Tr. 13, Exhibits "A" 4-5-63, "B," and 
"C"). On June 2, 1961, the ·mark was registered with 
the Secretary of State of the State of Utah, and a Certifi-
cate of Trademark Registration was issued to plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs were ·licensed for the years 1959, 1960, 
1961, and subsequently with the Department of Business 
Regulations of the State of Utah (Tr. 12, Exhibit "F," 
Exhibit "J," 4-5-63, Tr. 195 ) , such licenses being in the 
name of Mademoiselle Salon of Beauty (William Garth 
and Marjorie H. Seegmiller) . Plaintiffs held a grand 
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opening of their beauty salon on or a·bout May 23, 1959 
(Exhibit "J ," 4-5-63, Tr. 24). The salon has since been 
clearly and brilliantly marked and identified by a large 
neon sign (Exhibit "F", 1-3-63, Tr. 9, 12). 
Prior to the time defendant began business in Ogden, 
Utah, plaintiffs advertised extensively over KLOR-TV, 
the range of broadcast of which includ·ed Weber, Morgan, 
Cache, Salt Lake, Rich, and other counties (Exhibit "F", 
4-5-63, Tr. 88, 158, 159) . Plaintiffs also advertised over 
radio stations KOVO and KEYY of Provo, Utah (Tr. 
26, Exhibit "L"). KOVO could be heard all over the 
State of Utah at nights (Tr. 26). Plaintiffs advertised 
MADEMOISELLE SALON OF BEAUTY in t~he Daily 
Herald of Provo, Urah, a newspaper of general circulation 
in the State of Utah, and in the Brigham Young Univer-
sity Daily Universe (Tr. 14, 15, 16, 25, Exhibits "D", 
"E"~ and "M"). The B.Y.U. Universe was distributed to 
about 12 to 13 thousand students from practica'lly every 
state in the Union (Tr. 16, 17). Plaintiffs advertised in 
the telephone directories covering Utah County and 
Nephi, in Juab County, in 1960, 1961, and 1962 (plain-
tiffs' Exhibits "S" "T" "U" Yellow Pages 24 26 and 
' ' ' ' ' 25, respectively, Tr. 69). Prior to June 2, 1961, plain-
tiffs spent about $5,500.00 in advertising MADEMOI-
SELLE (Tr. 71). 
Plaintiffs were well known throughout the State 
under the name and style of MADEMOISELLE, and had 
an excellent reputation (Tr. 93, 105, 106, 107, 109, 128, 
130, 131, 133~ 135, 136, 146, 147). They have had cus-
tomers from Brigham City, Ogden, Logan, Centerville, 
as well as from many other parts of the State of Utah, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
and from without the State of Utah (Tr. 76-79, and 
149-156). Sales of trademarked containers of hair spray 
took place in Salt Lake County to an Ogden resident long 
prior to defendant's use of the name (Tr. 34). 
In 1958, and prior to May 1, 1959, at the time the 
name MADEMOISELLE was selected, there was no 
other beauty salon in the State of Utah using the name 
MADEMOISELLE. Plaintiffs had checked with the 
Utah Department of Business Regulations (Tr. 10, 11), 
checked telephone directories throughout the State (Tr. 
9) , and could find no other beauty salon doing business 
under the name or style of MADEMOISELLE (Tr. 22). 
On or about May 19,1961, defendant, AI Hunt, 
began business in Ogden, Utah, under the name of 
MADEMOISELLE COIFFURES (Tr. 7, 41). Defend-
ant ordered a sign for his business on or about April 
1, 1961 (Tr. 41). 
The name MADEl\1:0ISELLE was and is distinctive 
(Tr. 109, 120), and confusion has resulted between 
plaintiffs' and defendant's businesses (Tr. 120). The 
court correctly found that the plaintiffs' and defendant's 
tradenames were similar and would be confusing, but in-
correctly found that the two companies are operating in 
d1ifferent trade areas and that they are not in competition 
with each other ( R. 12 ) . 
Detendant claimed that he had not heard of the 
use by plaintiffs of the name MADEMOISELLE before 
June 2, 1961 (Tr. 41); then admitted that he had known 
of it shortly after the defendant open~ed his business (Tr. 
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42), and then finally admitted that it had :been men-
tioned to him that there was a MADEMOISELLE SA-. 
LON in Provo, Utah, about the time the defendant 
opened his business in Ogden, U·tah, (Tr. 186). T~e De-
fendant had discussed the name of MADEMOISELLE 
with a Mel Greenhalgh, a $ales~an for the Peerless 
Beauty and Barber Supply, Salt Lake City, before the 
shop opened and at the time Defendant first contacted 
~fr. Greenhalgh to order his equipment (Tr. 51, 184, 
185). Mr. Greenhalgh was salesman for Peerless Beauty 
and Barber Supply (Tr. 97) ; Plaintiffs had been d·oi~g 
business with Peerless Beauty and Barber Supply from 
the beginning in May, 1959 (Tr. 22, 25, 26). 
Plaintiffs brought suit against the defendant· for in-
junctive relief to enjoin the defendant from further use 
of the trade or service mark MADEMOISELLE and for 
damages ( R. 1, 2). The matter of damages was reserved 
by the court until the determination of the ownership of 
the name 11ADEMOISELLE. The court found that the 
plaintiffs' and defendant's trade names MADEMOI-
SELLE are similar, and would be confusing, except that 
the t\vo cotnpanies are operating in different trade areas. 
The court furtl1er found that the plaintiffs' registration 
of their nan1e vvith the Secretary of State would have 
given the plaintiffs a right to use their tr~~e r:tame on a 
state,vide basis had it been timely registered; however, the 
lower court held that, at the time of registration on June 
2, 1961, the defendant had previously adopted such name 
and had not abandoned it and that the adoption was 
v:ithout knowledge of plaintiffs' trade name. The court 
further foand that plaintiffs' registration of their trade-
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name on June 2, 1961, after the defendant had also 
adopted such name, was invalid. 




BY REASON OF PRIORITY OF ADOPTION AND 
USE, PLAINTIFFS ARE THE COMMON LAW 
OWNERS IN UTAH OF THE TRADEMARK AND 
TRADENAME "MADEMOISELLE" AS APPLIED 
TO HAIR STYLING SPRAY AND COSMETICS 
AND TO BEAUTY SALONS. 
a. Acquisition of Basic Rights 
In the absence of prior conflicting right, the adop-
tion and use of the t~rad~emark MADEMOISELLE by 
plaintiffs as early as the year 1959 through their sale of 
hair styling spray in containers bearing labels imprinted 
with the mark (Tr. 13, Exhibit "C") established a com-
mon law right to the mark in plaintiffs. 
"Undoubtedly, the general rule is that, as be-
tween conflicting claimants to the right to use the 
same mark, priority of appropriation determines the 
question." 
Unit~ed Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co. 
248 u.s. 90, 100 ( 1918) 
b. Territorial Considerations 
It is well recognized that such a right has terri to rial 
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limits. Thus, it was held in a somewha·t earlier U. S. 
Supreme Court case, cited with approval in the United 
Drug case: 
". . . . . where two parties independently are em-
ploying the same mark upon goods of the same class, 
but in separate markets wholly remote the one from 
the other, the question of prior appropriation is 
legally insignificant, unless at least it appear that the 
second adopter has selected rhe mark with some de-
sign inimical to the interests of the first user, such as 
to take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to 
forestall the extension of his trade, or the like." 
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf 
240 u.s. 403,415 (1916) 
Ho\vever, with respect ~to what constitutes "separate 
markets wholly remote th·e one from th·e other," the 
court said: 
"Into whatever markets the use of a trade-mark has 
extended, or its meaning has become known, there 
will the n1anufacturer or trader whose trade is pir-
ated hy an infringing use be entitled to protection 
and redress." (pp. 415, 416). 
The extent of use in an area to create the right and 
warrant the protection need not be large in the instance 
of a technical trademark. 
"In case cf a technical trade-mark as here dealt with 
(Sweet Sixteen for dresses), while there must, of 
course, be some user in trade in the disputed field of 
trade, the quantum thereof need not be large." 
Sweet SiX'teen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop 
15 F. 2d 920, 925 (CCA8, 1926) 
In the cited case, wherein the defendants in Salt 
Lake City were enjoined from continuing use of the name 
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''Sweet '16' Shop" for a dress shop, even though the 
originai Cali,£ornia appropriators of the trademark "Sweet 
Sixteens" and the tradename "Sweet Sixteen Company" 
ha~ no store in Utah and had made only a total of eight 
maii order sales over a period' of about two years during 
t~e c~rculation in Uta·h of out-of-state newspapers con-
taim~g its advertisements and the distribution by it of a 
quantity of mail order catalogues, the court referred to 
the Hanover Star Milling :and United Drug cases (supra) 
as follows: 
"Obviously, the trade-marks under discussion in the 
Hanover and Rectanus Cases were likewise technical 
trade-marks, but in neither of the latter cases had 
there been any sales, advertisements of goods, or user 
whatever by complainants therein in the territory 
there in controversy." ( p. 9 2 5 ) 
c. Nature and Use of Plaintiffs' Mark 
In the present case, it is obvious that the mark 
MADEMOISELLE is a technical trademark on the same 
basis that the court in the Sweet Sixteen Case (supra) 
regarded SWEET SIXTEEN as such. In fact, the lower 
court expressly found this so by its holding that plaintiffs' 
Utah State Registration would have been valid if made 
prior -to defendant's adoption of a similar mark. More-
over, even though the lower court gave as one of the 
reasons for its decision adverse to plaintiffs that "the two 
companies are operating in different trade areas and are 
not in competition with each other," this is apparently 
based on consid·eration of the service aspect of the case 
without due regard for the trademaTk or tradename as-
pect, as in the Sweet Sixteen case. 
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It cannot be denied that the evidence clearly shows 
pcnf'tration and use of plaintiffs' trademarks in Salt Lake 
and Davis Counties (Tr. 34) and at least extension of 
the reputation of both trademark and tradename into 
those and other neighboring counties (Tr. 13-19, 26, 76-
80, 83-87, 91-93, 128-131, 134-136, 146, 149-156, 174, 
and 175. Exhibits "B", "C", and "G") prior to defen-
dant's adoption of the mark, thereby establishing extend-
r.d rights as contemplated by both the Hanover Star 
Milling and the Sweet Sixteen cases. 
d. Knowledge of Plaintiffs' Name by Defendant 
Though the Sweet Sixteen case is much cited as 
precedent for an exception to what has been termed the 
general rule of the Hanover Star Milling case, because the 
court found the defendants to have known of the plain-
tiff's use of its name before actual use by such defendants 
of their infringing name, and, therefore, to have selected 
the name "wi~th some design inimical to the interests of the 
first user," careful analysis of the facts shows that the 
differences there and here are very small even though 
the lower court apparently found against plaintiffs on 
this issue. 
Thus, the defendants, there, received telegraphic 
notification from the plaintiff only four days before is-
suance of a certificate of registration to them by the State 
of Utah, and, though they had not actually commenced 
business, it is apparent that they had filed for registration 
at least ten days previously under the then existing Utah 
la\v requiring publication once a week for two successive 
,,·ccks. There \Vas no other evidence of knowledge by the 
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defendants of the plaintiff's activities, although the cir-
cuit court apparently drew several inferences (Sweet 
Sixteen Co. v. Sweet 16 Shop, supra, p 924) which 
might reasonably be d~rawn in the present case on the 
basis of reluctant admissions by the defendant here (Tr. 
41, 42, and 184-186) and the circumstances (Tr. 22, 25, 
26, 97). 
In the present case, defendant positively knew of 
plaintiffs' prior use of the name "sometime about the time 
that we opened up" (Tr. 186). 
e. No Question of Estoppel Here 
It is significant to n~te that both the Hanover Star 
MiUing (supra, p. 419) and the United Drug (supra, p. 
103) decisions stress the factor of estoppel as a reason for 
denying protection to a trademark owner who confines 
his use of the mark to a limited geographical area over a 
period of many years (Hanover 40 years; United Drug 
35 years). 
In the Hanover case, the court said : 
". . . . . they must be held to have taken the risk 
that some innocent party might, during their forty 
years of inactivity (in the contested area) , hit upon 
the same mark and expend money and effort in 
bui'lding up a trade in flour under it ... And when 
it appears, as it does, that the Hanover Company in 
good faith and without notice of the Allen & Wheeler 
mark has expended much money and effort in build-
ing up its trade in the south-eastern market, so that 
'Tea Rose' there means Hanover Company's flour 
and nothing else, the Allen & Wheeler Company is 
estopped to assert trade-mark infringement as to that 
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territory." ( p. 419). 
In the present case, the defendant knew of plaintiffs' 
use of the name "sometime about the time we opened 
up'' (Tr. 186) ; he had direct notice in writing from 
plaintiffs within two and a half months (Tr. 47, Defend-
ant's Exhibit 6) ; and th'is suit was commenced within 
three months ( R. 1 ) . 
It should be particularly noted that, in the Sweet 
Sixteen case, the defendants acted on the advice of legal 
counsel (Sweet Six~teen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, supra, 
p. 921). 
f. On the Evidence, There Should be no Question as to 
Plaintiffs' Rights Throughout the State of Utah 
It is submitted that the present case is not one like the 
Hanover Star Milling, the United Drug, and the Sweet 
Sixteen cases, where the adverse use could reasonably be 
said to be "in separate markets wholly remote the one 
from the other" (Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 
supra, p. 415). Rather, it is one such as Justice Holmes 
had in mind when he said, in his concurring opinion in 
the Hanover Star MiHing case: 
.. 
"I think state lines, speaking always of matters 
outside the authority of Congress, are important in 
another way. I do not believe that a trade-mark 
established in Chicago could be used by a competitor 
in some other part of Illinois on the ground that it 
was not known there. I think that if it is good in one 
part of the State it is good in all. But when it seeks 
to pass state lines it may find itself limited by what 
has been done under the sanction of a power coordi-
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na~te with that of Illinois and paramount over the 
territory concerned." (p. 426) 
Although the above vi·ew was directly criticized in 
the rna j ority opinion ('p. 416) and has not been generally 
regarded with favor by scholars in the field of trademark 
law, it r-eceived tacit suppovt by th·e majority in the 
Un~ted Drug case (only two and a half years later) suffic-
ient to satisfy Justice Holmes when the entire court said: 
"It would b·e a perversion of the rule of priority to 
give it such an application in our broadly extended 
country that an innocent party who had in good 
faith employed a trade-mark in one· State ... might 
afiterwa~ds be p,revent·ed from using it ... at the in-
stance of one who therefore had employed the same 
mark but orrly in other and remote jurisdictions ... " 
United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co. (supra, p. 
100) 
Without urging the proposition that State lines 
should be a:bsolute criteria, as might be implied from 
Justice Holm·es' concurring opinion in the Hanover Star 
MiHing oase (supra), it is submi~ted that they do have a 
place in the consi,deration of trademark rights under the 
common law and properly define the territory within 
whlch plaintiffs' trademark and tradename rights should 
be given protection by this Court under the facts of this 
case. 
See: 
Callmann "Unfair Competition and Trade-
Marks" 
2nd Ed. Vol. 3 p. 1202 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, Inc. v. Oil City 
Refineries, Inc. 
136 F. 2d 470 (CCA6, 1943) 
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g. Holdings by Other Courts 
The foregoing decisions are basic m the law of trade-
marks as respects the acquisition and enforcement of ter-
ritorial rights. The legal principles involved have been 
followed or discussed time and time again, but with dis-
cretion based on the facts of each case and with a ten-
dency toward upholding the first appropriator's rights 
to an ever increasing extent. 
Terminal Barber Shops, Inc. v. Zoberg et al 
28 F. 2d 807 (CCA2, 1928) 
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati 
166 F. 2d 348 (C,CA9, 1948) 
Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery 
Corp. 
301 F. 2d 156 (4CA, 1962) 
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Western Auto Sup-
ply Co. 
13 F. Supp. 525 (Dist. Ct. N.H., 1936) 
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Marcus 
36 F. Supp. 90 (Dist. Ot. E.D. Pa., 1941) 
Adam Hat Stores, Inc. v. Scherper 
45 Supp. 804 (Dist. Ct. E.D. Wise., 1942) 
Quality Courts United, Inc. v. Quality Courts, 
Inc. 
140 F. Supp. 341 (Dist. Ct. M. Pa., 1956) 
It is interesting to note that, in the Terminal Barber 
Shop case, a chain of barber shops and beauty parlors 
in New York doing no business in New Jersey but having 
customers there was granted relief from use of the name 
in New Jersey by a later user. 
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14 
II 
COMPETITION IS NOT AN ESSENTIAL ELE-
MENT OF TRADEMARK OR TRADENAME IN-
FRINGEMENT AT COMMON LAW. 
"Lack of competition between the parties no longer 
is a defense to an action for unfair competition. 
Defendants have raised this ~ssue in cases where there 
is no direct ~com pe~i tion .... because they do business 
in different territovies. Formerly the emphasis was 
on competition, and lack of it was considered a suf-
ficient .defense .... In recent years this case (Borden 
Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co. 201 
F. 510, 514 CCA7, 1912) has been distinguished and 
its doctrine rejected (citing a long line of cases)." 
Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks," 
4th Ed. pp. 1194, 1195 
See also: 
3 Restatement, Torts, par. 730, comment (a) 
White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle 
System of Eating Houses Corp. 
90 F. 2,d 67 ( CCA6, 1937) 
Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission 
138 F. 2d 824, 826 (CCA2, 1943) 
Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati (supra) 
The Brass Rail, Inc. v. Y e Brass Rail of Mass-
achusetts, Inc. 
43 F. Supp. 671 (Dist. Ct. D. Mass., 1938) 
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III 
PLAINTIFFS' UTAH STATE REGISTRATION 
CONSTITUTES PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF 
THEIR EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF THE 
TRADEMARK "MADEMOISELLE" FOR BEAUTY 
S.~LON SUPPLIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND IS VALID. 
The Utah State Trade-Mark Act (Title 70, Utah 
Code Annotated) provides: 
"Any certificate of registration issued by the 
secretary of state und·er the provisions hereof or a 
copy thereof duly certified by the secretary of state 
. . . . shall be prima facie evidence of exclusive own-
ership of the trade-mark or se:rvi·ce mark by the 
registrant." (70-3-5) 
State registration statutes are in affirmance of -~he 
common la\v (CaHmann "Unfair Competition and Trade-
l\1arks," 2d Ed., Vol. 4, p. 2088), and, as such, base the 
right to register on priority of use. The doctrines of Han-
over Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf (supra) and United 
Drug Co. v. Rectanus (supra) with respect to territorial 
rights are actually exceptions to the general rule that the 
first user of a trademark is its owner, see Point I (a) 
herein and White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle 
System (supra). 
Thus, the plaintiffs were completely justified in mak-
ing oath at the time of filing their application for registra-
tion, on June 2, 1961, that "no other person has the right 
to use such trade-mark or service mark ... in the State of 
Utah." 
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It is submitted that defendant has failed to uphold 
his hurd·en of proof that there is, in fact, some other per-
son who has the right to use plaintiffs' 'trademark -
in the State of Utah adversely to plaintiffs. 
RespectfuHy submi,tted, 
LIONEL M. FARR 
574 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PHILLIP V. CHRISTENSON, for 
CHRISTENSON, NOVAK, PAUL-
SON &TAYLOR 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
PHILIP A. MALLINCKRODT 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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